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Healthcare Policy
By George Avery, PhD

-Pay for Performance-

Advances in the Understanding
How Provider Incentives Produce
Quality Health Care
ince the 2000 publication of the Institute of
Medicine report, “To Err is Human,” the issue of
healthcare quality has been one of the foremost issues in healthcare. According to this
report, as many as 99,000 preventable deaths
occur annually due to medical errors. Most of these are
believed to occur as a result of system errors rather
than failure on the part of an individual provider.
Addressing this problem is of increasing
importance.

S

Roughly defined, health care quality is
the delivery of the appropriate care at
the right time. Concern over the quality
of healthcare is not new. Indeed, it is
responsible for most of the major
systemic reforms in the United States
healthcare system, including such early

...“PUBLIC POLICIES TO ADDRESS HEALTHCARE QUALITY
HAVE FOCUSED ON PUNITIVE MEASURES SUCH AS
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION OR REGULATORY POLICIES...”
reforms as the licensing of physicians, regulation
of pharmaceuticals, and the accreditation of
medical schools as advocated in the Flexner
Report nearly a century ago. Studies in the 1970s
and 1980s noted wide inconsistencies in the
practice of medicine, indicating that many patients
may not have been receiving appropriate care.
Much of the “Managed Care Backlash” of the
1990s focused on perceptions of reduced quality
of care supposedly resulting from payer interference in the physician-patient relationship. In a
2003 article in the New England Journal of
Medicine, Elizabeth McGlynn and colleagues found
that Americans receive as little as half of the
appropriate care that they should.
Historically, public policies to address health care
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quality have focused on punitive measures such
as malpractice litigation or regulatory policies
such as facility and provider licensing. In recent
years, the litigation approach has come under fire
as rising malpractice insurance premiums have
resulted in providers withdrawing from practice,
as happened with emergency physicians in Las
Vegas, Nevada. Such incidents have raised
concerns that the opportunity costs of regulation
through litigation decrease healthcare access and
increase costs. The regulatory approach, represented by such varied policies as provider licensing, direct regulation such as the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988,
and so forth, have been found to improve quality,
but again at a high opportunity cost. Christopher
Conover of Duke University, for example, has
estimated that the net cost of healthcare regulation over and above the benefits obtained
exceeds $120 billion annually.
As a result, much recent attention has been
focused on creating positive incentives for
providers to improve the quality of care, primarily
by adjusting payment rates to reward higher
quality providers. Such “Pay-for-Performance”
programs are not new. Part of the motivation for
the 1973 Health Maintenance Organization Act
was a belief that capitated provider payment
would create incentives to minimize unnecessary
care. This philosophy played a role, along with a
desire to control costs, in formulating the diagnostic related group (DRG) payment system for
hospitals in the 1980s. Capitated plans, whether
based on patients or incident of care were
intended to promote the most efficient care,
however, they did not discriminate on the overall
quality of that care.
This can be a problem because quality improvement can be costs. In a 1992 Medical Care study,
RC Morey estimated that for every 1%

improvement in quality, hospitals
incurred cost increases of 1.34%. In
a cost control environment, this
creates disincentives to quality
improvement. As a result, a movement has begun to try to reward
providers with increased payment
levels for meeting quality goals, with
the belief that by increasing
reimbursement, the barriers imposed
by higher costs can be overcome,
resulting in a better quality of care.
To date, over 100 health care pay-forperformance programs have been
attempted in the United States, and
the Center for Medicaid and Medicare
Services is funding several demonstration projects to test the feasibility
of using pay-for-performance in
Medicare to spur systemic improvement.

In practice, the results from these
programs have been mixed. The
PacifiCare Health System program, as
reported in 2006 in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, gave
bonuses to providers meeting certain
basic fixed quality measures.
Unfortunately, the program ended up
paying bonuses largely to already
high quality providers, and resulted in
little improvement. On the other
hand, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Hawaii has had success in improving
cardiac care, as has Michigan’s
Participating Hospital Agreement
Program.
These disparate results largely result
from the fact that, until recently,
there was a lack of a theoretical
understanding of how incentives
change provider behavior. This is
changing. In August, we presented a
model in the American Journal of
Medical Quality that explains the
tradeoffs made by providers between
maximizing profits and quality. What
we found is that the critical issue is
the marginal return to providers from
improving quality, that is, providers
improve quality until the return from
adding another unit of quality is
matched by the cost of doing so.

In programs such as the PacifiCare
demonstration, with a fixed bonus
payment for meeting a target goal,
the only point at which a marginal
gain can be realized from quality
improvement is when the provider is
close to, but below, the quality
target. In this small range, providers
can increase their income by a small
effort to reach the goal. For most
low-quality providers, the cost of
reaching the goal exceeds the return
from the fixed bonus, and thus there
is no incentive to improve. For highquality providers, no effort is
necessary to earn the bonus, and
hence no incentive exists for improvement. Thus, funds primarily flow to
already high quality providers, and no
real incentive exists for improvement.
Successful programs, in contrast,
have a floating incentive system with
increasingly higher quality levels
receiving increasing reimbursement
levels.

R. Adams Dudley and colleagues
elaborate with a behavioral model of
provider responses to incentives in a
2007 Health Policy article. In addition
to the structure of the incentives,
they argue that the salience of the
measures used to the provider’s
practice, the structure of the provider
organization and internal incentives,
the provider’s regulatory and market
environment, and patient factors are
also determinants of how healthcare
provider’s respond to incentives.
While consistent with our general
model, this model raises a number of
other important questions. Are the
measures used to assess quality true
measures of quality? As Creech noted
in The Seven Pillars of TQM, outputs
that are measured and rewarded are
those that are performed. Hence,
ensuring that measures are appropriate is a critical task to assure that
quality improves. Current measures
such as the Hospital Quality Alliance
Hospital Compare dataset are good
indicators of the quality of care for
specific conditions, but legitimate
questions remain over whether they

capture broader views of hospital
quality.

Who is assessed and rewarded a
bonus – individual physicians? Medical
groups? It is important that the
proper organizational level is chosen
to ensure that the incentives are
targeted at the right decision level. As
we increasingly learn that team work
is critical to proper quality, it becomes
important to target the right team of
care providers. The issue is also
important for provider buy-in. Proper
diabetes care, for example, involves
coordination of primary care with
laboratories, opthamologists, and
potentially other subspecialists.
Targeting the incentives at the
primary care physician or group alone
does little to get buy-in from specialists, and can create distrust among
the primary care providers, who may
see themselves as unfairly singled
out. At the same time, incentives can
be undercut if internal provider payment structures do not result in
providers realizing a gain from
changes in how they practice.
All of these remain open questions as
we advance into an era of rewarding
providers for providing high quality
health care. While problems remain,
there is hope in the fact that we are
beginning to develop sufficient understanding of the way these incentives
work to finally begin to ask the right
questions and structure programs to
maximize the return from investing in
quality.
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